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BUILDING CODE ENFORCEMENT FOLLOWING HURRICANE HUGO IN SOUTH CAROLINA

In the immediate aftermath of major disasters, homeowners and businessmen want
to return to their residences and company structures, perform necessary repairs,
and then get on with their lives as quickly as possible.

Getting on with it,

however, may not be a simple process wh i ch takes a few hours or even a few days.

When

structures are damaged and where building codes are strongly enforced, community
leaders may be far more interested in the long term welfare of their citizens,
putting them through a thorough building inspection and permit issuance process,
than in guaranteeing speedy reconstruction by shortcutting the process.

For

public officials concerned with long term safety, a disaster can also provide a
window of opportunity to enact more stringent building code requirements to
regulate reconstruction and thereby improve the overall quality of structures in
the community.

Thus, how quickly a community recovers from a major disaster is

partially determined by how community leaders trade off long term mitigation
benefits against short term recovery needs.
The enforcement of building codes following a major disaster has not been well
studied.

The purpose of this research was to investigate how building codes were

complied with in the city of Charleston and neighboring South Carolina cities and
counties during the initial recovery period following Hurricane Hugo.

It was

hypothesized that the sheer volume of damaged and destroyed buildings (estimated at
over 80% of the buildings in Berkeley, Charleston, Georgetown, and Horry counties
alone) would overwhelm the resources and capabilities of local building officials.
It was further hypothesized that building officials would face a community wide
demand for rapid rebuilding and that they would incorporate coping mechanisms, such
as the granting of variances to building codes, which could accelerate the
rebuilding process but which would also allow the same officials to retain control
over the process.
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METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted using a case study approach.

Data were gathered

from open-ended interviews with community leaders, local and state building code
officials, and civil engineers.
reconstruction decisions.

Written documents were sought which recorded

(Interviewees and their communities will not be clearly

identified for confidentiality reasons.)
This study was conducted over a fifteen month period in conjunction with a
National Science Foundation funded study to investigate the political process in
the city of Charleston and the state of South Carol ina to mitigate future hurricanes
and earthquakes following Hurricane Hugo.

During that time period, which included

four trips to South Carolina in November, 1989, and January, May, and September,
1990, interviews were conducted with over 75 politically influential persons,
including 17 directly relevant persons.
data proved very valuable.

The extended length of time to collect

In initial interviews, there was a reluctance on the

part of some building officials to openly discuss details of the rebuilding process;
in these cases, many i ntervi ews were needed to gain the confi dence of the
i ntervi ewee before accounts of what occurred were provi ded.

Later i ntervi ews also

revealed that initial damage assessments were often erroneous; with time to
evaluate the true nature of the damage and their community's responses,
i ntervi ewees were able to correct mi staken op in ions given hast il y wh il e they were in
the process of recovery.

Because there was often no way to veri fy the statements of

the interviewees and there was no attempt to systematically collect data, the
results of the i ntervi ews shoul d be vi ewed as tent at i ve and shoul d not be cons i dered
as defi nit i ve.

HISTORY OF BUILDING CODES AND CONSTRUCTION METHODS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
To place the events in South Carolina into perspective, a brief history of
building codes in the state is provided.
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Currently, there is no mandatory

statewi de bu il ding code.

Cit i es and count i es have the opt i on of adopt i ng bu il ding

codes, although they must adopt the Standard Building Code if they choose to
. exercise their option.
The desire among local officials for the adoption and enforcement of standard
building codes in their communities is relatively recent (SCAC, 1989).

Until 1972,

when the state 1egi s 1 ature adopted a fQrma 1 pol icy grant i ng incorporated cit i es and
counties the power to adopt the Standard Building Code, only a few cities and
counties independently enacted building code ordinances to meet their needs.

The

cities of Charleston and Columbia were the first to adopt building regulations, in
1907 and 1916, respectively.

Charleston County was the first to adopt the Standard

Building Code for unincorporated areas in 1968.

Slowly, other more populous

counties like Greenville, Lexington, and Richland followed suit.

By mid-1989,

approximately half the cities and towns and 17 of the 46 counties (containing 75 to
80% of the total state population) had adopted mandatory codes (Lindbergh, 1989).
Although it is certainly important for communities to have building codes, the
integrity of the structures is dependent on the enforcement of building codes.
When the damage from Hurricane Hugo was first examined, it was clear that buildings
constructed to code regulations fared far better than those which had not (AIRAC,
1989).

Gary Wiggins, Director of the South Carolina Building Codes Council,

claimed that more serious damage occurred in those areas without code enforcement
(AIRAC, 1989: 4).
Bes ides 1 acki ng a mandatory statewi de bu il ding code, South Carol ina 1 aws do not
require that building inspectors be certified.

Local jurisdictions determine the

qualifications of their building inspectors.

There is a great unevenness among

local communities and counties in regard to the quality and qualifications of
building officials.

At the time of Hurricane Hugo, only one building inspector in

the state was reported as having an engineering degree.

Several respondents

remarked that the majority of building official s were pol itical appointees who were
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educated through on-the-job training, although there was a conscientious movement
in many localities to increase the number of trained, certified personnel.

When

Hurricane Hugo struck, most communities and counties had three or fewer certified
building inspectors.

The city of Charleston was recognized as having the most

professional staff in the state.
Due to the fact that the adoption of building codes by a minority of counties in
the state has been such a recent phenomenon, a significant number of buildings in the
state were constructed without regard to building codes.

Because the state had a

hi story of recurri ng hurri canes and had been shaken by a major earthquake in 1886,
many poorly constructed buildings had been destroyed through the years.
Presumably learning from experience, many indigenous builders had employed methods
and materials in the construction of their structures to withstand some degree of
wind and shaking.

However, there was no inventory of buildings which identified

which were well built and which were poorly constructed.
The respondents generally agreed that the state and its communities were
inadequately staffed with building officials, and they recognized the need for
improved building standards.

To overcome the deficiencies, concerned building

officials and civil engineers formed Citizens and Organizations for Minimum
Building Standards (COMBS) in 1987 to promote a mandatory statewide building code
and to require certified building inspectors (Lindbergh, 1989).

They drafted

legislation, which was introduced by Senator Glenn McConnell and Representative
Ralph Davenport in the South Carolina General Assembly in March, 1989, six months
prior to Hurricane Hugo.

The legislation failed to reach the floor of either house

in the 1990 legislative session.

(See Mittler, 1990, for a history of this bill.)

FINDINGS

The pri mary concern of th is study was to invest i gate the degree to wh i ch 1oca 1
communities enforced or deviated from their building inspection and permit issuance
4

processes and then to document specific decisions which led to these outcomes.
Because 16 of the 24 counties severely damaged by Hurricane Hugo did not have
mandatory building codes, the findings are limited to the few counties that did.
1.

No community attempted to enforce the building code on all structures

damaged by Hurricane Hugo.

The working hypothesis of this study was that the local

building officials would be overwhelmed by the number of structures requiring
inspection and would initiate ways to short circuit the official rebuilding
process.

That hypothesis proved to be true, especially in the most damaged

counties.

In one city with a relatively large professional staff, the building

inspections department was tasked by the Mayor to survey the city and identify
buil di ngs that were structura 11 y unsafe so they coul d be shored up or demo 1i shed.

A

decision was made for the building officials to concentrate their energies on the
worst of the damage.

Unable to deal with structures suffering minor damage,

especially to roofs, the chief building inspector reported that home owners could
repair their own residences without inspection and permits if they claimed the
buildings had suffered no structural damage.

As far as he was concerned, given the

limitations of his resources, this was the only way the city could cope with the
scope of the disaster.

A county official supported this decision because the

"immediate problem was fixing the structures, not permits."
In one inland city devastated by the hurricane, the director of public safety
stated that his city suspended the enforcement of all building codes.

Not being on

the coast, the city was unprepared for a major hurricane and did not have the
resources to deal with the destruction caused by one.

In this city, public safety

dictated that citizens be allowed to immediately repair their structures to provide
needed shelter.
The small staffs of building officials at both the city and county levels were
forced into tradeoffs concerning the repair of residences.
residential

structures with minor damage,
5

Instead of inspecting

some concentrated on licensing

contractors, who showed up from allover the country.

By issuing licenses, the

offi cia 1 s fe 1t they cou 1d po 1 ice the qual i ty of repa irs.

In the city of Charl eston,

outside contractors were required to be fingerprinted and photographed; many
refused and left the area.
Not all counties rejected their obligation to inspect all damaged structures.
In one moderately damaged county, the County Council strictly forbade any
suspension of inspections.

To carry out his duties, the county's building and

zoning administrator had his two certified building inspectors drive through the
county

and

identify

significant

siding

and

structural

damage.

After

identification, owners were notified that they would be required to obtain permits.
So as not to make this an onerous task, all permit fees were waived.
initial

inspections took place,

temporary inspectors.

While the

the administrator began hiring additional

(FEMA funds were available to partially cover the costs.)

Because of the high number of ret ired people in the 1oca 1 area, he was able to fi nd
two retired building inspectors and several tradesmen (e.g., electricians,
plumbers, and contractors) who could be trained rapidly on the job.
The feeling among many county officials was that permit fees were a barrier to
homeowner compliance.

To encourage homeowners to seek permits, respondents from

three counties reported that in two counties permit fees were waived and in one
county permit fees were cut in half.

All believed that fee reduction was a

successful means of improvi ng buil di ng code enforcement and homeowner comp 1 i ance.

2.

No city or county advocated or implemented a policy to grant building code

variances.

Universally, granting variances was not perceived as a method to speed

up the rebuilding process.
this procedure.

In fact, the opposite was cited as a reason not to employ

In both cities and counties, hearings would be needed to approve

variances, adding to the bureaucratic steps needed to issue a building permit.
Prior to Hurricane Hugo, cities and counties historically had routinely denied most
variance requests, and, for the few granted, demanded that structural elements be
6

strengthened elsewhere to maintain a building's integrity.

Clearly, granting

variances was not considered a viable emergency procedure.
Even if building officials had elected to grant variances, many building
officials and civil engineers said candidly that there was no reason in South
Carol ina for contractors to bother with variance requests.

By simply ignoring code

requirements, they could get what they wanted without the effort.

Because building

codes had been adopted so recently in most communities and many building officials
had not been sufficiently trained to recognize when a structure was not being
designed to code, there was no reason for contractors to indicate they were not going
to build to code.

They could claim their plans did comply with the code and expect

to get their plans approved, or, if there was some doubt, they could enlist an
engineer or an architect to approve the plans.

With an architect's or a

professional engineer's seal affixed to the documents, building officials would
routi nely approve thei r approva 1s.

Most respondents concl uded that enforcement of

building codes was so spotty that requests for variances were unnecessary.

3.

The strictest code enforcement resulted from the insistence of the Federal

Insurance Administration (FIA).

As part of the National Flood Insurance Program,

the FIA was responsible for guaranteeing that structures undergoing repair meet the
flood reconstruction guidelines, especially the elevation of structures above the
IOO-year flood level.

Threatened with the possible loss of insurance for their

communities if reconstruction did not comply with federal guidel ines, local
building officials were careful to enforce federal guidelines.

Without the

diligence of the FIA monitoring local actions, it is possible that the coastal
regions would have been rebuilt without proper consideration given to mitigation.

4.

Damage assessment, project design, and reconstruction in the hardest hit

areas were aided immensely by volunteer engineers and architects.

Almost

immediately after the hurricane, the Volunteer Technical Assistance Group (VOLTAG)
was established by the South Carolina Section of the American Society of Civil
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Engineers and other professional architectural and engineering organizations.
VOLTAG volunteers joined engineers from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to conduct damage assessments of public facilities in the 24 counties
declared disaster areas by the President.

Later, volunteers were able conduct a

damage assessment of the Town of Sullivan's Island, where virtually every building
was damaged and many were destroyed.

Because the town had no full-time building

inspector, the volunteer engineers provided the technical assistance first to
identify and mark public and private hazardous facilities and later to conduct
detailed inspections which formed the basis of a demolition and reconstruction
program.
Several months after the hurricane when the initial recovery period had passed,
volunteers from VOLTAG assisted local communities in the design of new public
buildings and in the supervision of project construction.

These actions ensured

that reconstruction met code requirements. (For a full description of the
activities of VOLTAG, see Lindbergh, 1990).

DISCUSSION
How building codes were enforced in South Carol ina after Hurricane Hugo should
not be taken as a mode 1 for other states.

The bu il ding offi cia 1s coped as best they

could, but underlying negative attitudes toward building codes and their
enforcement hindered the application of improved construction methods.

In most

cases, public officials and private citizens were not sufficiently motivated to
demand that damaged buildings be reconstructed to withstand future natural
disasters.

As far as most were concerned, immediate recovery was more important

than long-term mitigation.

(Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to

compare the rebuilding of Cal ifornia cities following the Lorna Prieta earthquake to
the cities in South Carolina, the three cities hardest hit by the earthquake, Los
Gatos, Santa Cruz, and Watsonvill e, and others enacted ord i nances withi n days of the
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earthquake to strengthen building codes, especially in regard to the repair of
unreinforced masonry buildings.}
As one civil engineer reported, citizens in South Carolina will not demand more
stringent building codes until their attitudes toward the consequences of natural
disasters change.

He holds the opinion that most citizens "do not believe that

hurricane damage is an avoidable event."
structural damage is "providential,"

As far as the citizens are concerned,

not "preventable."

This suggests that an

effort to educate the public to the nature of disasters and how to prevent future
destruction will be needed before construction practices throughout the state
improve.
Despite the seeming lack of desire for citizens to demand the improvement of
their building stock, they have generally been protected by their structures.
Recent detailed inspections of the communities impacted by Hurricane Hugo have
indicated that the majority of damage was minor but repeated on a large scale.

Most

building inspectors and civil engineers are now convinced that the majority of
damage was caused by inferior roofing and siding techniques and materials.
According to these experts, even if building codes were mandatory and strictly
enforced, damage from future natural disasters might still be substantial because
the Standard Building Code does not adequately prescribe hurricane resistant
roofi ng techni ques.

They suggest that the code shoul d be strengthened where it is

weak.
Even though the state suffered cons i derab 1e damage, the people of South
Carol ina did not demand much of the state in terms of repair and mitigation.
appear to be two main reasons for this attitude.
have considered themselves to be self-reliant.
rely upon themselves and their neighbors.

There

First, citizens traditionally
Most live in rural settings and

Second, until recently, most local

governments have not been actively involved in either disaster recovery or
mitigation.

Most citizens consider themselves conservative, defining "good
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government as no government. II

In respect to their government bodies, most citizens

expect little and do not complain when little is offered.

CONCLUSIONS
The response of build i ng and other government offi cia 1sin South Carol ina was
considered by every respondent to be IIreasonable, given this was a time of great
stress.

1I

The hypothesis that the amount of damage done to buildings in South

Carolina due to Hurricane Hugo would overwhelm building officials so short cuts
would have to devised for recovery to take place proved to be true.

Building

officials concentrated their energies on identifying the worst of the damage,
particularly to publ ic buildings.

In this endeavor, they were aided by volunteer

engineers and architects.
For the most part, inspect i on of res i dent i a1 structures was 1eft to homeowners.
This proved to be one way that recovery was accelerated.

In addition, the

el imination or reduction of permit fees and the careful 1 icensing and monitoring of
outside contractors were successful methods to ensure that building codes were
adhered to.

No community employed building code variances to speed up the permit

process.
Civil engineers believe there is no reason to believe that the built environment
in South Carol ina is any safer now than it was before the hurri cane, except that many
of the most vulnerable structures were destroyed and are being replaced by better
buil di ngs.

The deci s ions made by city and county offi ci a1s were a imed at short term

recovery, not long term mitigation.

As one civil engineer reported, for example,

in some flood areas, houses and mobile homes are now mounted on blocks above the
required FIA regulations, but they are so flimsy, they will probably be knocked over
by wind and water forces.
Until citizens and government officials decide that the prevention of future
damage from natural disasters is humanly possible, it is doubtful that South
10

Carolina will learn much from Hurricane Hugo.

It will also not be surprising to

read an analysis similar to this following the next disaster.
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